Abstract. A firm partially financed by debt is considered. The firm is subject to two types of shocks: macro-shocks modeled as a finite state Markov chain, and idiosyncratic shocks. The dynamics of the latter may depend on the state of the macroeconomy; the state of the economy is determined not only by fundamentals but the market sentiment as well. The lenders are competitive and debt is rolled over until the macro-state changes. If conditions improve, the firm has an incentive to pay off debt and issue new debt on more favorable conditions. On the other hand, if conditions deteriorate, then debt covenants allow lenders to require debt renegotiation. It is also possible that in some states, the firm cannot roll over the debt at all (credit crunch). We compare the credit spreads which the model in the paper produces with the spreads in a less flexible model (Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) ), where the coupon is chosen at debt inception and remains fixed thereafter, and study the dependence of the spread on debt maturity, the market sentiment and probability of a credit crunch.
Introduction
Predicting corporate default probabilities is instrumental to correctly pricing corporate debt, making informed capital structure decisions and investing wisely in associated credit derivatives. This problem has become increasingly important over time, with the corporate bond market expanding to become more important than direct bank lending as a source of credit for US companies. Although in most recent years there has been some reversal of the trend due to deregulation and redistribution of loans to other banks and specialized investors, the current credit crunch is likely to precipitate a dramatic increase in the number of corporate bond offerings.
In the words of Alan Greenspan, "we may never have a perfect model of risk". Financial analysis has long made default probability prediction an important objective. Researchers in corporate finance have developed numerous structural models that address both the valuation of corporate securities and the choice of financial structure by the firm. Recent events, however, have demonstrated that the available models are too simple and fail to incorporate important features of the overall economic environment. In the paper, some of these shortcomings are corrected by developing a new tractable structural model of debt.
Despite substantial development of the literature, little attention has been paid to nonfirm-specific sources of credit risk. Intuitively, it is not surprising that the firms' capital Department of Economics, The University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station C3100, Austin, TX 78712, U.S.A. Phone:+1 (512) 475-8521 E-mail: sboyarch@eco.utexas.edu. structure decisions and, thus, default risk should depend on overall economic conditions, suggesting that models should take the macroeconomy into account. It is likewise not incomprehensible that market sentiment also plays an important role in determining the amount of credit available to individual firms and corporate default rates. While economic downturns may coincide with market pessimism, asset-price bubbles occur at higher than business-cycle frequencies, so that investor fears may occur during economically-good times as well. Also, according to a recent International Monetary Fund study (see, Claessens et al. (2008) ), one out of six recessions was related to a credit crunch, but while the typical recession lasted four quarters, a typical credit crunch lasted two and a half years. This definitely indicates that more than two macro states are necessary to access default risks. The goal of this paper is to develop a framework for analyzing the impact of macroeconomic conditions, market sentiment, and credit crunch on credit risk and optimal choice of the capital structure.
Prediction of corporate bond default rates has been an objective of financial analysis for decades. The rating process itself has been the proprietary information of the rating agencies. Starting with the seminal papers of Merton (1974) , Black and Cox (1976) , Leland (1994 Leland ( , 1998 , Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) , and Leland and Toft (1996) , academic researchers have developed various structural models of debt (often termed "credit risk" models) that became widely used by practitioners (for example, Moody's-KMV). Traditional structural models had two important empirical shortcomings: underestimation of credit spreads and underestimation of short-term default probabilities (see, e.g., Leland (2004) and discussion therein). These shortcomings were blamed on assumption of a pure diffusion process for the underlying firm value. Therefore several credit risk models with jumps were suggested, for example, Zhou (2001) , Hilberink and Rogers (2002) , Boyarchenko and Levendorskiǐ (2002), Giesecke and Goldberg (2004) , Chen and Kou (2005) . Typically, those models either do not offer analytical solutions or do not analyze default risk and liquidity premium.
Traditional structural models have also paid little attention to the effects of macroeconomic conditions on credit risk and capital structure choices. At the same time, there is some empirical evidence that macroeconomic conditions influence the probability of default. See, for example, Fama (1986) , or Duffie and Singleton (2003) . Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) (hereafter, [HMM] ) study the influence of macroeconomic factors on credit spreads and show that changing macroeconomic factors imply a countercyclical earnings default boundary. However, they only model the economy in booms or recessions, while the number of macroeconomic states is richer and should probably include some intermediate states. David (2007) prices corporate debt in a model where expected earnings growth rates and expected inflation follow a Markov switching process and are unobservable. He does not endogenize corporate financing decisions. Tan and Yan (2006) use the same framework as David (2007) , but with an observable mean-reverting growth rate for firm earnings and without explicitly accounting for inflation. The default boundary in Tan and Yan (2006) is given exogenously: default occurs when the firms cash flow cannot cover the interest payments. Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2007) were the first to embed a structural model of credit risk inside a consumption-based model. They assume that the first and second moments of fundamental economic growth rates vary with the business cycle, which is modeled by a regime-switching process. Their model generates co-movement between aggregate stock return volatility and credit spreads, consistent with the data and potentially resolves the equity risk premium and credit spread puzzles. They also model the economy in booms or recessions only.
Following Leland (1998) , [HMM] assume that the maturity of debt, the principal and coupon are fixed at debt inception. The debt is issued at par, and the proceeds are distributed to the initial shareholders as dividends. When the debt is rolled over, the maturity, principal and coupon payments do not change. This ingenious device simplifies the problem greatly and allows one to reduce the problem to a stationary problem. This set-up is fairly realistic if the economy remains in one macro-state forever, as in Leland (1998) , where neither booms nor recessions were modeled. In the model with booms and recessions [HMM] , the ability of the firm to roll over the debt forever postulates, in effect, that the credit conditions remain the same in booms and busts. Thus, by construction, the models in Leland (1998) and [HMM] do not allow for endogenous adjustments in the conditions for borrowing. In particular, they rule out effects such as the current credit crunch.
In this paper, we extend the model in [HMM] to allow the (endogenously determined) interest rate and the very availability of credit to depend on macroeconomic conditions. As in [HMM], we assume that the debt profile is exponential, and the average maturity, M , is fixed and not chosen by the firm optimally ( unlike [HMM], we allow the average maturity to vary with the state of the economy). The principal, P , is chosen so as to optimize the firm's capital structure at the moment of debt inception and remains constant until the state of the economy changes for a better one. The firm refinances (at a cost) its debt each time macro-economic conditions improve. The interest rate ρ (equivalently, the coupon payment, C = ρP ) is chosen so that at the moment of debt inception the debt is issued at par and remain constant while the economy is in the same state. If the macro state changes for a worse one, debt holders re-adjust the coupon payments so that the face value equals the debt value; debt profile may also change; therefore future interest rates depend on the state of the economy and the level of the firm-specific shock when the debt is rolled over. In each state of the economy, the firm may find it optimal to default should the idiosyncratic stochastic factor reach or fall below a certain default threshold; the threshold depends on the state of the economy.
In addition, we assume that investors are risk averse and require a risk premium over the riskless rate. This premium becomes even more important in the current economic conditions and may serve as a proxy for market sentiment. Greenspan (2008) states that the existing risk and macro econometric models are too simple. They do not capture what "... has been to date, only a peripheral addendum to business-cycle and financial modeling -the innate human responses that result in swings between euphoria and fear..." (see Greenspan (2008) ). Greenspan (2008) thinks that market sentiment is "the large missing explanatory variable" in risk management. One might argue that economic downturns may coincide with market pessimism. However, Authers and van Duyn (2008) point out that "hope springs almost eternal on Wall Street", and even though the "collapse of the Dow after 1929, and of the Nasdaq after 2000 saw falls of about 80 per cent over three years, yet both saw several 'bear market rallies'." Also, investor fears may occur during economically-good times as well, because asset-price bubbles occur at higher than business-cycle frequencies. Therefore, it is reasonable to model market sentiment as an additional stochastic factor. We also consider the case of an additional state of irrational exuberance when the risk premium becomes negative.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model without the credit crunch state is described and solved in a general form in Section 2. We calculate the value of the unlevered firm, and derive in the general form the system for debt values in different states given the default boundaries, and the system of optimal default problems for the default boundaries and the levered firm's values in different states. Then we solve the optimal default problem in the general form using a natural iteration procedure. The detailed formulation of the model with arbitrary number of states of the macroeconomy is unwieldy and makes understanding of the underlying mechanism difficult. Therefore, we will increase the degree of complexity step by step. In Section 3, we consider a model with two states: boom and recession, the firm's specific uncertainty being modeled as a Brownian motion with drift and volatility depending on the state. The Brownian motion assumption is not important for the method of the paper and is made only to simplify the specification of the model. Investors' risk premium over the riskless rate in recessions is higher than in booms, so there are no additional states reflecting the market sentiment. We compare the results to a one-regime model. The one regime model is used as an initial approximation for the iteration procedure and its results are instructive themselves. The one-regime model corresponds to the case when the debt is issued in a boom state, and the equity value in a recession is zero. Therefore the probability of regime switch affects the discount rate only. In this case, the optimal default threshold is at a constant distance, h * , from the firm's idiosyncratic shock, e x , at the moment of the debt inception, and the optimal principal is proportional to the idiosyncratic shock, e x . So, the firm borrows no matter how small it is.
As opposed to this, in a two regime model, even though the firm gets a positive value in a recession, since the credit conditions may become worse due to actions of debt holders, the firms become more cautious when issuing the initial debt in a boom state. The model predicts that the firms with idiosyncratic shocks below a certain level, do not borrow at all. Only sufficiently big firms, issue debt. So, the possibility of adverse changes in the debt contract is worse than just an exogenous probability of dropping out of the market.
In Section 4, we introduce additional states, which account for irrational market sentiment: the state when lenders lose confidence in the macroeconomy although the fundamentals remain sound, and the state of bear rally when the lenders wrongly (and temporarily) believe that the economy has turned the corner. Finally, in Section 5, we introduce the credit crunch state, when the sentiment becomes so gloomy that the lenders refuse to buy any new debt. Hence, in this state, the firm can only retire its debt as it expires -until the firm finds it optimal to default. The firm can survive if either the state of macroeconomy improves, and the new debt can be issued or the firm's specific shocks become favorable so that the firm can survive in the credit crunch state as an equity financed firm. Both in Sections 4 and 5, we study the dependence of the probability of default, in recession and credit crunch states especially, on the level of irrational optimism during irrational exuberance state and bear rally state. We also compare the results of our model with the results of [HMM]-model. To this end, in Section B, we formulate and solve a generalization of [HMM]-model for arbitrary number of states using the straightforward modification of the method in Section 2.
The method utilized in the paper is very flexible. Assuming that the firm's value functions in all states but state j are known, the exit problem in state j is solved explicitly. As a result, a system of 2m equations 1 with 2m unknowns obtains. m unknowns are value functions, and the remaining m are default thresholds. Even if m is measured in hundreds or even thousands, the system can be solved (numerically) fairly fast using a straightforward iteration method, the initial approximations to value functions being set to 0. 
where Λ j = k =j λ jk . The firm's management discounts the future at constant rate r > 0. However, the lenders, when calculating the expected present value of the coupon and recovery in the event of default in state j, increase the discount rate r by a margin, denote it λ j , which represents the market sentiment prevailing in the current state of the economy (in principle, λ j can be negative: the case of the irrational exuberance). The firm's profit after tax is modeled as
is a Brownian motion. Thus, the pair -market sentiment λ and production factor G -is modeled as a vector-function on the state space {1, 2, . . . , m} of the Markov chain Z. The sample paths of the process X t = X (j t ) t for the firm's specific uncertainty are continuous. To be more specific,
where x is the spot value of X, and W is the standard Wiener process. Here µ(j) ∈ R and σ(j) > 0 are the drift and volatility of the Brownian motion in state j. Note that the continuity of the sample paths of X does not exclude jumps in the after tax profit at the moments of switching because the factor G = G(j) depends on state of the macroeconomy. Set q j = r + λ j . For the time being, we will impose the usual no-bubble condition on the (after tax) profit flow δ t , both from the point of view of the firm and lenders
A simple sufficient condition, which can be, and will be, relaxed, is the no-bubble conditions for each state of the macroeconomy: for any j, . Then the no-bubble conditions (2.4)-(2.5) are equivalent to 
. , m, which satisfies the bound (2.7). Note that on the RHS in (2.8), the process is the Brownian motion (X (j) t ) and not the regime-switching process (X (j t ) t ), which makes the reduction to systems of the integro-differential equations straightforward. Indeed, using the relation between L j , the infinitesimal generator of the process X (j) , and the normalized expected present value operator (EPV-operator) 3 E j,r+Λ j and the infinitesimal 2 Recall that the characteristic exponent appears in the formula for the characteristic function of the Brownian motion and, more generally, Lévy process: E e zX (j) t = e tΨj (z) . 3 For q > 0, the (normalized) EPV operator E = E q or normalized resolvent of a (Markovian) process X with the infinitesimal generator L is given by
generator L j of the process X (j)
, we derive a system of differential equations
Under the first condition in (2.6), a solution of the system (2.10), whose components admit the bound (2.7), is unique and it is given by
where G = (G 1 , . . . , G m ) and B f is the inverse to the matrix
Remark 2.1. The really important condition is that the entries of the matrix B f are non-negative. This can be easily deduced from (2.6) , and, after some additional work, from a weaker condition (see Boyarchenko and Levendorskiǐ (2008) ).
Similarly, we derive v
. . , G m ) and B l is the inverse to the matrix
2.3. Debt and its valuation. Since the firm pays taxes, it has an incentive to issue debt. Let C be the coupon which the firm pays on its debt. As in Leland (1998) and [HMM] , we model the tax advantage to debt as τ C, where τ > 0 is independent of the current stream of operative profits, hence, on the implicit taxes on this profit. A more realistic version of the model, when the tax advantage to debt decreases or even vanishes as profits do, is possible and will be considered in the future. Suppose that in the initial state j, the firm issues the bond of principal P , which will remain constant as long as the firm is solvent and the state of the economy does not improve. While the economy remains in the same state j, the principal attracts coupon C j = ρ j P . The firm continuously rolls over a fraction m j of the debt and replaces it with the new debt of equal coupon, principal and seniority. In the absence of default, the average debt maturity in state j is M j = 1/m j . Let p j = m j P be the new debt principal issued at each instant in state j. Notice that the value of the debt depends on the value of the underlying stochastic factor, X (j) t , at the moment of debt issuance. Hence the new debt selling price is not necessarily equal to its face value, p j . If the selling price of the new debt is less than p j , additional equity has to be raised to cover the difference.
, both sides of (2.9) being understood as operators in appropriate function spaces. See Levendorskiǐ (2006, 2007) for details.
If the firm defaults in state j, it is immediately liquidated, and the lenders get a fraction α j of the value of the unlevered firm. Since the lenders calculate the expected present value of the future profits using the risk premium corrections to the discount rate, the recovery value in state j is α j v l0 j . The lenders are assumed to be competitive, which means that debt is issued at par. Therefore, the interest rate is a function of the macro-state and level of the idiosyncratic factor at debt inception. This specification becomes the specification of [HMM] if we add the assumption that the debt is rolled over on the same conditions as at debt inception in any future state 4 . The model in the present paper relaxes exogenous restrictions on debt issue in the future as follows. We assume that the debt contract allows the firm to retire debt at a cost specified in the contract, and for the lenders -to require the renegotiation should the macro-conditions deteriorate significantly. Certainly, it would be even more interesting to allow the lenders to require the renegotiation even in the same macro-state should the idiosyncratic factor fall too low. However, this will increase the technical complexity of the model significantly. In the main body of the paper, we confine ourselves to the simpler extension of [HMM] described above; the more interesting albeit more involved extension will be outlined in Section ??. We simplify the refinancing decision of the firm in the similar vein assuming that the decision can be made only if the state of the macro-economy improves.
Note that in the two-factor model, it is difficult to tell unambiguously whether the current state j is "better" than another state k. Indeed, if the production factor G is higher in state j than in state k: G j > G k but the rate of growth Ψ j (1) < Ψ k (1), then, in the short-run, state j is better than state k, and in the long run, state k is better than state j. Therefore, depending on the transition rates from states j and k to the other states, and the properties of the other states, state j may be better than state k or the opposite may be true. This explains why we will specify the model completely on the case-by-case basis in the following sections. We will consider two states of the economy -boom and recession -as far as the fundamentals are concerned. Additional macro "substates" will account for the market sentiment. We will consider separately cases when the bear rally sentiment can be used by the firm to refinance debt on more favorable conditions even though the fundamentals have not improved, and when the better market sentiment is insufficient for this purpose.
Assuming that, for any state j, a clear distinction between "better" states and "worse" ones has been made, we denote by Ω + j the set of the former, and by Ω − j the set of the latter. (For each j, we exclude from Ω ± j states k with λ jk = 0, no matter what the properties of these states are.) Assume further that each improvement in the macro-conditions is significant enough for the firm to refinance, and each deterioration is sufficiently serious for the lenders to require renegotiation. Both decisions can be made endogenous if the production factors and growth rates significantly differ for different states, and the order is consistent:
In the model with the market sentiment, it may be necessary to require, in addition, that
In the two state model with boom and recession states, (2.15) means that with an advent of a recession, both the spot value of the production factor and the rate of growth drop significantly. Of course, in the geometric Brownian motion model, there is a non-zero probability that the idiosyncratic factor may reach such a high level that the firm's perspectives remain bright even when a boom turns into a recession. In this case, it may be non-optimal for the lenders to renegotiate the interest rate. However, if the transition rate from a boom to a recession is not small, this probability is small, and, therefore, our assumption that the refinancing and renegotiation of the contract are forced by changes in the macro-economy only, the quantitative changes are small nothing to say about qualitative ones. Similarly, if the macro-economic conditions improve but the stochastic idiosyncratic factor is too low then the gains from refinancing may not outweigh the prepayment cost. Probability of this event is even smaller because at very low levels of the stochastic idiosyncratic factor, the firm is likely to default before a switch happens. Hence, the simplifying assumption that the firm refinances its debt each time the macro-economic conditions improve, also does not significantly change the results (both qualitatively and quantitatively).
Denote by π 0 j the prepayment penalty for $ 1 of debt issued in state j, by h j the default boundary in state j, and by τ j -the first entrance time
In the next subsection, we will show how the firm's manager chooses the default boundary optimally. The lenders take h = (h j ) as given, and calculate the debt value as follows. Assume that a switch from state j to state k happened before the default in state j. Then (a) if k ∈ Ω + j , that is, the current state improves, then the lenders get the prepayment penalty π 0 j p, and the new debt is issued. Since the debt is issued at par, the continuation value for the lenders is 0 after the prepayment; (b) if k ∈ Ω − j , that is, the current state deteriorates, the lenders require debt renegotiation, and the continuation value for the lenders is 0 after the switch. Set π j = π 0 j k∈Ω + j λ jk , denote by x the level of the idiosyncratic factor at debt inception in state j, and by h j = h j (x) the default boundary in state j. Later, h = (h j ) will be found as the solution of the optimal default problem for the firm. The lenders take h as given, and calculate the value of a bond with face value $1 and maturity t issued in state j and at level x, for y ≥ h j , as follows
The first term represents all interest paid on the bond until default or maturity in state j, whichever happens earlier, plus the prepayment penalty if a switch to a better state happens. The second term is the present value of the principal returned if the bond matures prior to default and switch. The last term is the recovery value in case of default.
Since all debt has the same seniority, each holder of a bond with face value $1 is entitled to a fraction 1/P of the firm's recovery value. Let φ j (t) = m j e −m j t be the maturity profile in state j. The total value of the currently issued debt in state j is
In the Appendix, we show that
The current value of the total debt outstanding in state j is
The advantage of (2.18) is that we can use it to calculate the interest rate ρ j = ρ j (x, h j ) as the function of j, x, h j . Indeed, since the debt is issued at par, we have , the RHS in (2.18) can be calculated explicitly. In the BM case, one can use the standard approach as in Leland (1994 Leland ( , 1998 , [HMM] and many other papers: write the boundary problem for the stationary Black-Scholes equation associated with the process X = X (j) and discount factor q := q j + Λ j + m j , and solve the boundary problem using the standard ordinary differential equation technique. We will use explicit general formulas derived in Boyarchenko and Levendorskiǐ (2005 , 2006 , 2007 in terms of the expected present value operators (EPV-operators) 6 because these formulas are applicable for more general payoff functions than constant and exponential ones as in (2.18), and we will have to calculate stochastic expressions of a more general form below, when we will consider the value of the equity. An additional advantage of the general formulas is that they are valid for any process with i.i.d. increments. In particular, the general formulas allow one to generalize the results of the paper for the case of jump-diffusion uncertainty quite easily.
Let X be a Brownian motion, or, more generally, a Lévy process, and q > 0. The supremum and infimum processes are defined byX t = sup 0≤s≤t X s , X t = inf 0≤s≤t X s , and the (normalized) EPV-operators E ± := E ± q under the supremum and infimum processes are defined by (2.9), where X is replaced withX and X, respectively:
The EPV-operators can be interpreted as follows. Let T be the exponential random variable with mean 1/q independent of X. Then
It is immediate that the EPV-operators are monotone operators, which is important for the proof of optimal stopping theorems.
In the BM case, functions E The EPV-operators are convolution operators with exponential kernels: The stochastic expression (2.18) is of the form 
where κ ± (γ) are constants depending on the process. General formulas for κ ± (γ) are available -see Boyarchenko and Levendorskiǐ (2005 , 2006 , 2007 . In the BM case, 30) and introduce operators E ± l,j by 
In the BM case, we use (2.29) and (2.32) and calculate the RHS in (2.33) explicitly:
For the details of calculation, see Subsection A.2. Since the debt is issued at par, (2.19) holds. Substituting (2.33) into (2.19), we obtain a linear equation for K j (x, h j ), hence, for ρ j = ρ j (x, h j ):
In the BM case, (2.35) turns into
and we obtain
and
In the next section, h j will be found as a function of x. Note that if α j = 0, then ρ j (x, h) decreases with h, and, by continuity, the same holds if α j is small.
2.6.
Equity value in terms of the default boundaries. The state-j equity value is less than the value of the unlevered firm v f 0 j plus the expected present present value of tax benefits. Clearly, the latter cannot exceed the former, and, under the no-bubble condition (2.2), the former is finite. Hence, the equity value if finite. Denote by V j (x, y) the equity value in state j at level y of the idiosyncratic factor X (j) t , assuming that the latter was at x at debt inception in state j, and note that (1) the exit boundary h j = h j (x) and first entrance time τ j = τ j (x) depend on x, the spot level of the idiosyncratic factor at debt inception; (2) the interest rate ρ j = ρ j (x, h j ) given by (2.37) depends on x and h j = h j (x). Thus, ρ j = ρ j (x, h j (x)) will be completely determined by j and x. As long as the firm is solvent in state j, the stockholders pay the coupon, ρ j P , receive the after tax revenue flow, G j e X (j) t , tax benefit, τ ρ j P and the net cash flow, d j (x, h j ; X (j) t )− m j P , which is the market value of the new debt net of the redeemed fraction, m j P of the principal. If a switch to a better state happens, the stock holders also have to pay the penalty for debt prepayment. If the firm defaults, the equity holders get nothing. It follows that the vector-function V = (V j (x, y)), defined for y ≥ h j := h j (x) satisfies the following system of equations
Let E ± f,j be the EPV-operators under the supremum and infimum processes defined for q = r + Λ j and process X (j) (recall that the firm uses the discount factor r rather than r + λ j used by debt holders):
where it is assumed that X (j) , hence,X (j) and X (j) start at 0. Set
Applying (2.27), we find that the stochastic expression (2.38) is given by
where w j (x, h j ; y) = E + f,j g j (x, h j ; y) and E ± f,j act w.r.t. y. 2.7. Endogenous default. The firm's manager chooses the default boundary in each state to maximize the firm's value, and she can solve this optimal default problem as follows. Clearly, the firm's state-k value is a non-decreasing function of the idiosyncratic stochastic factor, which is 0 for sufficiently low levels of the latter. Hence, function g j (x, h j ; y) is an increasing function of the third argument, which changes sign. The EPV-operator E + f,j can be represented as an expectation operator:
and T is the exponential random variable with mean 1/(r + Λ j ) independent of X (j) . Therefore, E + f,j is a monotone operator, and w j (x, h j ; y) is an increasing function in y that changes sign. Operator E − f,j is also monotone, therefore, it is evident from (2.40) that the optimal choice of the default boundary must replace the negative values of w j (x, h j ; y) by zero and leave the non-zero ones as they are. We conclude that h j = h j (x) must solve the following equation:
Adding (2.40) evaluated at y = x:
we obtain the system of 2m equations (2.41)-(2.42) parametrized by x, where g j are given by (2.39), and ρ j (x, h j ) -by (2.37), whose unknowns are the optimal default thresholds and firm's value at debt inception. The system of equations (2.41)-(2.42) can be solved fast using a natural iteration procedure, and after h and V (x, x) are found, V (x, y) can be easily calculated from (2.39) and (2.40). Suppose that the initial debt contract was issued in state j and at that point the firm's capital structure was optimal. Let x 0 was the value of X (j) 0 . Then the principal, P is chosen so as to maximize the total value of the firm, which is the equity value and the debt value, i.e., V (x 0 , x 0 ) + P . See Subsection A.3 for details.
3. Boom and recession: the basic Brownian motion model 3.1. Debt value and endogenous interest rate. Consider the economy with two macro-states: boom and recession (labelled 1 and 2, respectively).
Note that it is natural to presume that the economy is in recession not too often, hence, Λ 1 < Λ 2 (presumably, much smaller). Calculating B l , the inverse to the matrix A l in (2.14), we find the value of the unlevered firm (from the point of view of lenders): v 
and det
According to the model specification, the refinancing can occur only at a moment of switch from state 2 to state 1, the refinancing cost being π 2 P . Therefore, the system of equations (2.37) for the interest rates in states 1 and 2 is
3.2. Equity value, endogenous default threshold, and optimal capital structure. We will focus on the case when the debt contract is issued in a boom state. The model can be generalized straightforwardly for the case when the debt is issued is a recession state. Similarly, system (2.39) consists of two equations, the last term in (2.39) being 0 for j = 1, and −π 2 for j = 2. Each of the systems (2.40), (2.41) and (2.42) also consists of two equations. Since the principal is borrowed when the firm's idiosyncratic shock is e x , and the value of the shock will be different from e x (generically) when the economy switches to a recession and debt holders request debt renegotiation, the equity value in the boom state depends on two variables (the idiosyncratic shock at the moment of debt inception and the current idiosyncratic shock), while the equity value in recessions depends on three variables: the idiosyncratic shock at the moment of interest rate adjustment, the current idiosyncratic shock, and the idiosyncratic shock at the moment of debt inception in the preceding boom state. Thus we have the following system of equations for the equity value
Optimal default thresholds satisfy w 1 (x, h 1 ) = 0 and w 2 (x, h 2 , z) = 0. The optimal principal P is chosen so as to maximize V 1 (x, x) + P . The problem is solved by an iteration procedure described in Subsection A.3. Figure 1 represents the default thresholds in the boom as function of firm specific shocks for the one and two-regimes models. We see that in the two regime model, even though the firm gets a positive value in a recession, since the credit conditions may become worse due to actions of debt holders, the firms become more cautious when issuing the initial debt in a boom state. The model predicts that the firms with idiosyncratic shocks below a certain level, do not borrow at all. Only sufficiently big firms, issue debt. So, the possibility of adverse changes in the debt contract is worse than just an exogenous probability of dropping out of the market. 
the only non-zero entry of a 12 is −λ 14 in the upper right corner, and the only non-zero entry of a 21 is −λ 41 in the lower left corner. Assuming that λ 14 is small (the probability that the boom turns into recession is small), we can utilize this block structure and reduce calculations to operations over 2-vectors and 2 × 2 matrices. Set
For the proof, note that (4.2) and a similar equation with the indices 1 and 2 interchanged holds. Substituting the former into the latter, we obtain
22 a 21 u 1 ). Solving the last equation for u 1 , we obtain (4.1).
After c l0 is calculated, we can apply the iteration procedure from Subsection 2.7.
Numerical example.

4.3.
Model with the irrational exuberance state. As everybody knows, periods of extreme optimism during the boom are also possible. For simplicity, we analyze the effects of the irrational exuberance by adding to the benchmark 2-state model one additional state, denote it 0. It is natural to assume that the irrational exuberance can appear only during boom, and end up with recession. Hence, only the following transition rates are non-zero: λ 12 , λ 21 , λ 10 , λ 02 .
4.4.
Comparison of the model without irrational market sentiment, with states of fear during boom and bear rally during recession, and with irrational exuberance state. We take the 2-state model as the benchmark, and consider how the probability of default (measured by the price of ...) change as the function of the negative irrational risk premium λ 0 −λ 1 < 0 in the irrational exuberance state, and on the negative irrational risk premium λ 3 −λ 4 < 0 during the bear rally. We also consider the conditional probability of default, the condition being that the recession has started or the bear rally ends. Thus, we try to analyze how dangerous periods of irrationality are.
5.
A model with the credit crunch 5.1. The model. To the states 1, 2, . . . , m with the properties described in Section 2, we add the additional state of the complete fear, where the investors do not want buy any new debt. We label this state 0. In the "credit crunch state" 0, after debt renegotiation, the firm pays out the outstanding debt and coupon but debt cannot be rolled over. Let x be the level of the idiosyncratic factor at the moment of switch to the credit crunch state, and t = 0 the moment of switch. After the switch but before the default and the next switch to another state, the firm receives the revenue stream G 0 e
t . In addition, as t ≤ M , the firm pays the stream p(1/M + (1 − τ )ρ 0 (x)(1 − t/M )), where ρ 0 (x) is the renegotiated interest rate. After t > M , all debt is paid out, and default becomes non-optimal at any level of the idiosyncratic factor.
It follows that in the default state, the default boundary is time-dependent: h 0 = h 0 (ρ 0 , t) , where, apparently, h 0 (ρ 0 , t) ↓ −∞ as t ↑ M and h 0 (ρ 0 , t) = −∞, t ≥ M . Note that in a similar model with non-zero operational cost c j , the firm may find it optimal to default even if there is no debt, and then the low bound for the default boundary for the levered firm is the low boundary for unlevered one.
5.2.
Firm's value and endogenous default. Assuming that the interest rate ρ 0 after renegotiation is known, and the firm's value in states j ≥ 1 are known as well, the firm's manager finds the default boundary h 0 (x, ρ 0 , t), t < M, maximizing
where τ 0 (x) is the first entrance time by the process (t, X
t ) into the region {(t, y) | y ≤ h 0 (x, ρ 0 , t)}. For t ≥ M , the state-0 firm's value is independent of t ≥ M and x:
The RHS in (5.2) can be easily calculated using
The optimal default problem on the time interval [0, M ] can be solved only numerically using time discretization and backward induction (equivalently, Carr's randomization approximation).
, and calculate V 0s (x, y) and h 0s (x), approximations to V 0 (x, t s ; y) and h 0 (x, t s ), s = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 0, maximizing the stochastic expression
where τ s is the first entrance time into (−∞, h 0s (x)]. Of course, V 0s and h 0s depend on the interest rate ρ 0 as well; we suppress the dependence in the notation to make the latter less cumbersome. Define
Applying (2.27) to (5.4), we obtain
For s = N − 1, g 0s (as a function of y) is a continuous monotone function that changes sign. Hence, w 0s enjoys the same properties, and it follows from (5.5) that h 0s (x), the approximation to the optimal default boundary is the unique solution of the equation
With this choice of h 0s , V 0s (x, y) given by (5.5), is a continuous non-negative non-decreasing function. Hence, for s = N − 2, g 0s enjoys the same properties as for s = N − 1, and we can iterate the argument above and calculate h 0s and V 0s (x, y) for s = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 0.
5.3.
Debt value and competitive interest rate. At t ≥ M , there is no debt outstanding, hence state-0 debt value v d 0 (x, t, y) = 0. Assuming that the interest rate ρ 0 after renegotiation is given, and the optimal default boundary as a function of ρ 0 has been found, debt value at t ∈ [0, M ) is given by
We calculate v 
where , j ≥ 0, are very good approximations because the if we calculate the firm's values in states j ≥ 1 taking into account that the firm's value in the credit crunch state is small but not 0, the default boundaries and firm's values will change insignificantly, hence, the firm's value and default boundary in state 0 also will change insignificantly, and debt value in all states also will change insignificantly.
Nevertheless, should one with to obtain the corrections to the 0-approximation, one can calculate them as follows. In the cycle in s = 1, 2, . . . , 
5.7.
Dependence of the probability of default in the credit crunch state on the level of irrational optimism.
Notice that Φ j (t) = φ j (t)/m j and Φ j (t) = −φ j (t). Set
Consider first the integral
Using integration by parts, we proceed as follows
Now we can write the value of the currently issued debt as
A.2. Calculation of (2.34). For the BM case, (2.33) assumes the form
and (2.34) follows from (2.29).
A.3. Algorithm for Subsection 2.7. In the algorithm below, the value functions for booms are calculated at points of a chosen grid
. . , N , in x, y-space; and for recessions, at points of a chosen grid
. . , N , in x, y, z-space; for an explicit numerical integration procedure for calculation of action of the EPV-operators, see Boyarchenko and Levendorskiǐ (2008) .
Step
Observe that this
Step 1 corresponds to a one-regime model with and additional discount rate, Λ 1 . The solution generates standard results: h
1 is independent of x. So, no matter how small a firm is, it borrows the amount of money proportional to its size.
In the cycle in n = 1, 2, . .
• Stop when max j sup R |V
< , where > 0 is the chosen error tolerance, and set 2) Given the firm's values in all states but a given state j, the unknowns in the problem for state j are the state-j interest rate, default threshold and firm' value. Clearly, the higher the firm's values in the other states are, the higher state-j firm's value is, hence, the competitive riskless rate and the default threshold must be lower.
3) More formally, assuming that ρ j (x, h) decreases with h (which holds if α j is not large), we conclude from (2.39), that g using the iteration procedure with the zero initial approximation. Below, for given ρ, we will find h as a part of the solution of the firm's optimization problem. Hence, h will be found as a function of ρ, and debt value will be a function of ρ. Substituting the result into (B.3), we obtain an equation, which can be solved numerically. Thus, we obtain a procedure, which calculates ρ = ρ(j 0 , x). 
, ρ; y).
Note that this procedure can be made more efficient (albeit more involved) as in the end of Subsection A.3 -see Boyarchenko and Levendorskiǐ (2008) for details.
B.3.
[HMM]-type model with the credit crunch. We apply the straightforward modification of the construction in Section 5, the only essential difference being that the interest rate in the credit crunch state remains the same as before the credit crunch, and not chosen after renegotiation.
